Rather than a crisis precipitated by fair value accounting, the crisis was a “run on the bank” at certain institutions, manifesting itself in counterparties reducing or eliminating the various credit and other risk exposures they had to each firm. This was, in part, the result of the massive de-leveraging of balance sheets by market participants and reduced appetite for risk as margin calls increased, putting enormous pressure on asset prices and creating a “self-reinforcing downward spiral of higher haircuts, forced sales, lower prices, higher volatility, and still lower prices.
- Development of additional guidance and other tools for determining fair value when relevant market information is not available in illiquid or inactive markets, including consideration of the need for guidance to assist companies and auditors in addressing:
- How to determine when markets become inactive and whether a transaction or group of transactions are forced or distressed
- How the impact of a change in credit risk on the value of an asset or liability should be estimated
- When should observable market information be supplemented with and/or reliance placed on unobservable information in the form of management estimates
- How to confirm that assumptions utilized are those that would be used by market participants and not just a specific entity
- Enhancement of existing disclosure and presentation requirements related to the effect of fair value in the financial statements.
- Educational efforts, including those to reinforce the need for management judgment in the determination of fair value estimates.
- Examination by the FASB of the impact of liquidity in the measurement of fair value, including whether additional application and/or disclosure guidance is warranted.
- Assessment by the FASB of whether the incorporation of credit risk in the measurement of liabilities provides useful information to investors, including whether sufficient transparency is provided currently in practice.
The report also recommends that FASB revisit its guidance on significantly impaired financial instruments, including consideration of narrowing the number of impairment models under U.S. GAAP. The report finds that under existing accounting standards, information about impairments is calculated, recognized, and reported differently based on the type of asset. The report recommends improvements in this area, including:
- reducing the number of models utilized for determining and reporting impairments,
- considering whether the utility of information available to investors would be improved by providing additional information about whether current declines in value are consistent with management expectations of the underlying credit quality, and
- reconsidering current restrictions on the ability to record increases in value (when market prices recover).
The full text of the Mark-to-Market Study is available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf
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